A cheap currency is an advantage in global competition. It might seem smart for national leaders just to devalue the currency. But this is a form of state meddling that has proved increasingly ineffective.
Since the crisis of 2008, many nations have tried to improve their competitive position by devaluing currencies, but none have managed to gain an advantage.
The central banks of the United States, Japan, Britain and the Eurozone have pursued policies that effectively amount to printing money, in part as a way to devalue their currencies. But each has achieved at best a brief gain in export share, because rivals quickly match each other's policies.
The rise in 2016 of Donald Trump, who keeps a hawkish watch on the moves of foreign central banks, made it increasingly difficult for any nation to devalue its currency without being called to account for it.
By 2019, many emerging countries had seen sharp currency depreciation, but with little boost to growth.
- One reason was foreign debt; since 1996, in the emerging world, the debt owed by private companies to foreign lenders had more than doubled as a share of GDP, reaching 20% or more in Taiwan, Peru, South Africa, Russia, Brazil and Turkey. For these countries, devaluation made it more expensive for private companies to service foreign debt, and forced them to spend less on hiring workers or investing in new equipment.
- Another factor that can derail devaluations is heavy dependence on imported food and energy. In this case, a cheaper currency will make it more expensive to import these staples, driving up inflation, further undermining the currency and encouraging capital flight. This is a recurring syndrome in nations like Turkey, which imports all its oil, but the problem is spreading.
- These days, even manufacturing powers are mere cogs in a global supply chain, relying heavily on imported parts and materials. They thus find it harder to capitalize on a cheap currency because devaluation raises the prices they pay for those parts and materials.
A rare occasion when devaluation worked
China, in 1993, was one of the rare devaluations that worked.
China had little foreign debt, it did not rely too heavily on imported goods, and its already strong manufacturing sector grew faster after Beijing devalued the renminbi.
But this was an exception that proves the rule in general you cannot devalue your way to prosperity.
Devaluation is increasingly less likely to work
Moreover, devaluation is increasingly less likely to work, even in China, which has grown to command 13% of global exports, the largest share any economy has reached in recent decades. It is just simply too big to expand much further and if it does devalue, others retaliate.
In late 2015, China devalued the renminbi by 3%, and many emerging nations responded immediately, erasing any competitive gain that Beijing hoped to achieve.
China is also making increasingly advanced exports, which are less price sensitive and gain less from a cheap currency.
In Korea, Taiwan, and China, technology and capital goods make up a rising share of exports.
The more advanced the economy, the less of a boost it gets from devaluations.
http://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2020/12/you-cant-devalue-your-way-to-prosperity.html
